For years, the European Commission harassed the conservative governments of Poland and Hungary, accusing them of undermining the rule of law.<\/p>\n
The precedent of the abuses of Donald Tusk's government in Poland<\/big><\/p>\n I have already discussed here the case of Poland, a country on which the European Commission of Ursula von der Leyen imposed sanctions when it had a conservative government, sanctions that were withdrawn by the mere change of government<\/a> (coincidentally with the arrival of Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who is a member of the European People's Party, the same party as Von der Leyen). Then, the European Commission remained silent in the face of the attacks on the rule of law by the Tusk government<\/a>, an authoritarian drift that led the president of the Polish Constitutional Court to accuse Donald Tusk of staging a 'coup d'\u00e9tat'<\/a>.<\/p>\n An analysis of Magyar's actions from a position critical of Orb\u00e1n<\/big><\/p>\n History is repeating itself now in Hungary.<\/strong> I am not writing this from a position of sympathy towards the previous government. Three months ago I presented my criticisms of Viktor Orb\u00e1n's term here<\/a> from a liberal-conservative point of view, and I pointed out that in the Hungarian parliamentary elections in April I would have cast a blank ballot. Following the victory of Tisza, P\u00e9ter Magyar's party<\/strong>, I criticized the ambiguity of his discourse here<\/a>. I am writing this new article, once again, from a principled position and without ties to any Hungarian political party.<\/p>\n The controversial 17th Amendment to Fundamental Law of Hungary<\/big><\/p>\n On July 13, the new Hungarian Parliament controlled by Tisza<\/strong> (thanks to the electoral law created by Fidesz that grants considerable overrepresentation to the winner of the elections) approved the 17th amendment to the Fundamental Law of Hungary<\/a>. The proponents of the amendment argue that it \"marked the beginning of the dismantling of public law by the previous government: the Hungarian state is recovering its institutions, limiting the concentration of power<\/strong>, strengthening the independence of the courts and the Constitutional Court, and creating a constitutional basis for the recovery of stolen public assets. Among the government's reasons was the need to re-establish the system of checks and balances<\/strong> and to restore the independence of the judiciary to the highest decision-making level.\"<\/em><\/p>\n The full text of that 17th Amendment can be read here.<\/a> Despite these claims, the amendment contains highly questionable measures, such as the removal of the President of the Republic<\/strong>, who has been in office since 2024. The currently applicable Article 10 of Hungary's Basic Law stipulated that his term of office would be five years.<\/p>\n An arbitrary term limit for members of parliament not applied in any other EU country<\/big><\/p>\n Furthermore, this text, approved with the votes of Tisza's deputies, introduces a term limit for members of parliament<\/strong>, prohibiting them from being elected if they have served in Parliament for twelve years. This is an arbitrary limitation on the right to political participation that does not exist in any other country of the European Union<\/strong> and is only contemplated in three countries: Mexico, the Philippines, and Costa Rica. The measure is clearly aimed at expelling Fidesz deputies from Parliament<\/strong>, as many of them would be excluded by its application.<\/p>\n Tisza maintains political control of the Constitutional Court and the Judiciary<\/big><\/p>\n Likewise, although Tisza claims to be defending judicial independence, he retains political control over the Constitutional Court<\/strong>, maintaining that the election of its members must be by a two-thirds majority in Parliament, which, coincidentally, is the proportion Tisza currently holds. The 17th Amendment limits the age of Constitutional Court members to 70 years<\/strong>, a limitation that was abolished by the 2011 constitutional reform. This change will allow for the immediate removal of four of its members<\/a>, including its president. Their successors will be elected by a Parliament controlled by Tisza. Tisza also maintains political control over the President of the National Office of the Judiciary<\/strong>, whose election is assigned to Parliament by a two-thirds majority, allowing Tisza to currently control his appointment.<\/p>\n The electoral law, heavily criticized by Tisza from the opposition, remains intact<\/big><\/p>\n Significantly, the current electoral law, heavily criticized by Tisza from the opposition, remains unchanged<\/strong>, because it now favors the new parliamentary majority. Clearly, these measures do not appear designed to strengthen democracy in Hungary, but rather to suppress its democratic checks and balances<\/strong>, which were already weakened by the actions of the Orb\u00e1n government.<\/p>\n The abusive dissolution of the conservative Mathias Corvinus College<\/big><\/p>\n In addition to all of the above, Hungary is witnessing some very alarming events. A few weeks ago, the dissolution of Mathias Corvinus College<\/a>, a conservative educational institution founded in 1996, was announced.<\/strong> This is a serious attack on freedom of education, motivated by the current government's criticism of the institution, which they linked to Orb\u00e1n's Fidesz party.<\/p>\n The suspension of the Fidesz website, a measure never before seen in an EU country<\/big><\/p>\n But without a doubt, the most controversial measure came this week.<\/strong> On orders from the public prosecutor's office, a theoretically independent institution but traditionally aligned with the government (as is the case in Spain and other EU countries), Fidesz's servers were seized<\/a> and its website has ceased to be operational<\/a>. This party denounced on its Facebook page<\/a>: \"Without prior notice, prosecutors showed up at the data center that houses Fidesz's servers with the intention of confiscating the entire communications system and the party's databases<\/strong>. This has not happened in Hungary since the end of communism in 1990! The Tisza Party's plan to eliminate Fidesz<\/strong> and, with it, the resistance to tyranny through political means, has failed. Therefore, the Tisza Party is now trying to legally disqualify Fidesz\"<\/em>.<\/p>\n
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